

1968/9
YEAR
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CONFIDENTIAL

Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.
Ray P. Osborne
Date 18/11/70

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

DEPT. **NEAR EASTERN**

FILE No. **NE Q 10/4** (Part) ⁽¹⁻⁴³⁾

TITLE: Sale of Arms and Ammunition
to Iraq.

NECESSARILY
OR P.A.

NAME PH
DATE 19/11/70
TO PH
SEE

16017/82

NE Q 10/4

7/8/70
22/11



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE


St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,

LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928 7999, ext 4237

Our ref: A/10/Clearances/1744

4 November 1968



You will be aware that in 1964 the Foreign Office and Army Department recommended that an embargo be placed on the supply of Small Arms etc to Iraq.

... David Murray, in his letter EQ 10/1 of 8th October 1968 (copy attached) to Miss Stevens, has indicated that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is prepared to relax this embargo.

As a result of this the General Staff have reconsidered their attitude to the supply of equipment to Iraq and have agreed to lift the embargo and consider each request on its merits.

Yours sincerely,

K. W. NUTTING

C.G. Warman Esq
Ministry of Defence DS13b

Copies for information to:

C.A. Alldis Esq	Ministry of Defence, Sales 1(N)
D.J.S. Murray Esq	Foreign Office, DT & SD
L.A. Savigar Esq	Ministry of Technology, EIR 1
J. Coates Esq	Ministry of Technology, EIR 2
D.E. Church Esq	Board of Trade, (Gen Div)
Miss J.E. Stevens	Board of Trade, (ELB)
R.E. Adams Esq	HM Treasury
J. Doyle Esq	Department of Economic Affairs

RESTRICTED

FROM: A. MILLER, SALES 5(b)(A)




Enter, please.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 307x 2-
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,

LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928 7999 Ext 3629

Our ref: 10/Clearances/1744



28 October 1968

P.C. 2/11

Dear Miss Stevens,

Export Licence Applications 1A/3940/68 and 1B/7549/68 for small arms components for Iraq refer.

Following receipt of the letter from Foreign Office dated 8th October 1968 we have again consulted the General Staff on this question. In view of the information contained in that letter they now agree to withdraw their objections to the issue of these licences.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) A. MILLER

folio 107
refers

Miss J.E. Stevens
Export Licensing Branch
Board of Trade

Copy to: D.J.S. Murray Esq D.S.D. ✓
C.G. Warnan Esq D.S.13 (b)
D.E. Church Esq B.O.T. (Gen Div)

From: K. W. Nutting, Sales 5b(A)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street,
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928 7999 Ext 4237

Our ref: A/10/Clearances/2122

2nd January
December 1969

Dear David

We have received a request from Clement Shaw & Co Ltd who are acting on behalf of Iraq for 5.5" gun spares valued at approximately £59,000.

The General Staff have no objections to this supply.

I should be grateful for your views on the supply of these spares to Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

Ken Nutting

D.J.S. Murray, Esq.
Foreign & Commonwealth Office DT & SD

Copies for information to:

C.G. Warman Esq
D.E. Church Esq
Miss J.E. Stevens
R.E. Adams, Esq
J. Doyle Esq

Ministry of Defence, DS 13(b)
Board of Trade, (KP)
Board of Trade, (ELB)
H.M. Treasury
Department of Economic Affairs

Mr. Makinson, (Near Eastern Department, W.133)

Please see Army Sales letter A/10/Clearances/2122 of 2 January, 1969 about the sale to Iraq of 5.5" gun spares.

2. I assume that you will have no objection to this sale and attach a draft for approval.

D. J. S. Murray

(D. J. S. Murray)
Defence Training and
Supply Department,
E MS24, Tel. MB1488
3 January, 1969.

to Murray

D.T.S.D.

I agree

Jan 13/1

Draft & issue, please.

OK

12/1

14 January, 1968

14/1/69
m j h
(5)

(3)

Please refer to your letter
A/10/Clearances/2122 of 2 January, 1969.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has
no objection to the sale to Iraq of
5.9" gun spares.



(D. J. S. Murray)
DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPT.

K. W. Nutting, Esq.,
Sales 5(b),
Ministry of Defence,
Main Building.

C.C. C. G. Farman, Esq., DS 13(b),
D. E. Church, Esq., E. of T.,
Miss J. E. Stevens, E. of T.,
R. E. Adams, Esq., Treasury,
J. Doyle, Esq., D.E.A.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry
No.

DRAFT Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—

K. W. Nutting, Esq.,
Sales 5(b)
Ministry of Defence,
Main Building.

From

D. J. S. Murray

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Defence Training
and Supply

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Please refer to your letter A/10/Clearances/
2122 of 2 January, 1969. The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office has no objection to the
sale to Iraq of 5.5" gun spares.

Copies to:

C. G. Warman, Esq.,
D. S. 13(b),
Ministry of
Defence,
Main Building.

D. E. Church,
Export Policy
Department,
Board of Trade,
1-19 Victoria St.,
S.W.1.

Miss J. E. Stevens,
Export Licensing
Branch,
Board of Trade,
Hillgate House.

R. E. Adams, Esq.,
H.M. Treasury.

J. Doyle, Esq.,
Overseas and
General Div.,
Department of
Economic Affairs,
Storey's Gate, SW1

Don 13/1

14/1/69

(6)

IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NO. 379

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
18 APRIL 1969

CONFIDENTIAL.

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 379 OF 18 APRIL REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO BEIRUT, BAGHDAD AND AMMAN.

REGISTERED
21 APR 1969
NEQ 10/4

ARMS FOR MIDDLE EAST

FOR BROWN, HEAD OF DEFENCE SALES, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE FROM ROBERTS:
OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION REFERS.

MR. F. R. CRADDOCK OF COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL INC., A COMPANY
BASED IN BEIRUT BUT WITH AN OFFICE ALSO IN LONDON, CALLED AS
ARRANGED TO INQUIRE ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF EARLY SUPPLY OF FOLLOWING
ARMAMENTS FOR DELIVERY TO IRAQ.

(1) POINT 50 BROWNING M.2 LIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, HEAVY BARREL,
FLEXIBLE TYPE. QUANTITY REQUIRED UP TO 2,000.

(11) MULTIPLE MOUNTS FOR ABOVE M.45 AND M.55.
QUANTITY REQUIRED UP TO TWO HUNDRED EACH.

BOTH ITEMS REQUIRED URGENTLY. POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT ALSO IN
JORDAN FOR MOUNTS, QUANTITY ABOUT FIFTY.

2. CRADDOCK ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF FOLLOWING FOR
IRAQ AND JORDAN:
AMMUNITION.

(1) SUB-MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION POINT 762 CALIBRE

(11) BROWNING POINT 50 CALIBRE AMMUNITION

(111) 106 MILLIMETRE RECOIL-LESS RIFLE ANTI-TANK AND CHEMICAL
ROUNDS.

ARMoured VEHICLES.

(1V) M.3 HALF-TRACKS (FOR WHICH HE SAID HE COULD PROBABLY ARRANGE
IMMEDIATE PURCHASE)

(V) CENTURION TANKS.

3. CRADDOCK WILL BE IN PARIS (AT PLAZA-ATHENEE) UNTIL TUESDAY
WHEN HE RETURNS TO BEIRUT. HE ASKED IF I WOULD ADVISE HIM ON
MONDAY OF

(A) POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF EXPORTS OF ABOVE TO IRAQ AND JORDAN.
HE SAID THERE WERE ALSO POSSIBLE MARKETS IN SYRIA AND EGYPT BUT
PRESUMED THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE IN CASE OF THESE LATTER
COUNTRIES.

1a /MM L/S

(B) AVAILABILITY AND QUANTITIES.

(C) PRICE.

HE SAID THAT IF CONDITIONS ACCEPTABLE HE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE LETTER OF CREDIT IMMEDIATELY FOR URGENT ITEMS AT PARA 1(1) AND (11) ABOVE.

4. PLEASE TELEGRAPH ON MONDAY AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE AND INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW YOU WOULD LIKE US TO PURSUE MATTER.

5. F.C.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO DUTY OFFICER, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE FOR TRANSMISSION TO HEAD OF DEFENCE SALES AND NISSEN, ARMY SALES. F.C.O. PASS PRIORITY TO BEIRUT, BAGHDAD AND AMMAN.

MR. SOAMES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
N.EAST. DEPT.
DEF. POL. DEPT.
D.T.S.D.
MILITARY ADVISER
U.N.D
N.AFR. DEPT.
P.U.S.D.
NEWS DEPT.
MOD INTERNAL

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY D.A. BEIRUT TO MOD (UK)

TELNO OYH 104 220615Z

APRIL 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

7

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 23 APR 1969 NEQ 10/4

ADDRESSED TO MOD UK TELNO OYH/104 OF 22 APRIL REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO FCO, PARIS, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, JEDDA, ABU DHABI..

OYH/104 220615Z APR PD

6
FROM BRIT DEF AT BEIRUT REF PARIS TELEGRAM 379 OF 18 APRIL
(NOT TO JEDDA) PD PLEASE NOTE THAT CRADDOCK OF COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
IS LISTED ON OUR COMMERCIAL SECTION FILE HERE AS QUOTE A
WELL-KNOWN CROOK UNQUOTE PD HIS WORDS SHOULD BE CHECKED CAREFULLY PD

FOR JEDDA PD CRADDOCK APPEARS TO HAVE SOME ASSOCIATION WITH
WING CRD (RETD) HORSLEY FORMER A A JEDDA AND RECENTLY ARRIVED
IN BEIRUT AS AN INDEPENDENT BUSINESSMAN PD

ABU DHABI YOUR 10/2 OF 13 JAN REFERS.

FCO PASS PRIORITY MOD AND ROUTINE TO PARIS, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI.

MR. KING

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO DCC/

FILES

N. EAST. DEPT.

D.POL. DEPT.

ARAB. DEPT.

D.T. & S.D.

EXP. PROM. DEPT.

P.U.S.D.

TR. POL. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

14/MAY 215

S E C R E T



Cypher/Cat A

BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE U.K.

OYH 231415Z APRIL

SECRET

Addressed to MOD UK OYH 231415Z APRIL. Repeated for information to FCO, Paris, Amman, Jedda and Abu Dhabi.

Ref MOD UK tel OYQ 211500Z APRIL.

7 Craddock of Commerce International was described to me by Bill of Shorts in similar terms to those in DEFAT Beirut tel OYH/104 of 22 April. However, a clash of commercial interests may have played its part.

2. Horsley who was also AA here during my previous tour and who often comes to Baghdad where he has contacts as he has in Damascus, operates as consultant to various firms including Short and Plessey but does work for Craddock.

FCO pass to Paris, Amman, Jedda and Abu Dhabi.

Mr. Evans

[Repetition to Jedda referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

[Sent to D.C C.]

FILES

N. East. D.

Arab. D.

Ex. Prom. D.

Tr. Pol. D.

Def. Pol. D.

D.T.S.D.

P.U.S.D.

EEEEEE

PA PAMM 215

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

(9)

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE D.A. BEIRUT

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

D.A. BEIRUT TELNO. 241240Z

TO JEDDA OF 24 APRIL, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 25 APR 1969 NEQ 10/4

ADDRESSED TO JEDDA REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO F.C.O.

OYH/107

YOUR TEL NO 45 OF 23 APR PD

CRADDOCK APPARANTLY ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY IN PARIS SAYING
HE COULD PLACE AN ORDER FOR ARMS AND CENTURIONS FOR IRAQI
ARMY ALSO CENTURIONS FOR JORDAN PD HE WANTED A QUICK ANSWER
OVER THE WEEKEND FROM MOD DEFENCE SALES IF EQUIPMENT WAS
AVAILABLE AND CLAIMED HE COULD ISSUE IMMEDIATE LETTER OF
CREDIT PD WE THEREFORE WARNED DEFENCE SALES THAT CRADDOCK
(WHO I DO NOT KNOW) HAS DUBIOUS REPUTATION PD HORSLEY RECENTLY
APPLIED FOR VISA FOR SAUDI ARABIA (MY LETTER DA/46 OF 27 FEB
REFERS) AND INTENTION WAS TO WARN YOU THAT HE WAS WORKING IN
ASSOCIATION WITH THIS APPARENTLY UNRELIABLE CHARACTER.

MR. KING

F I L E S

N.EAST.D.
DEF.POL.D.
DEF.T.& S.D.
MILITARY ADVISER
P.U.S.D.
DIS.M.O.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

PA. PHUA


2/5

GGGGG

From A. MILLER,
Sales 5(b)(A)


Please enter

10



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone: 01-928 7999 Ext 3629



Our reference: 10/Clearances/1778

29 May 1969

Dear Tony

Before the meeting with Maj Gen Shanshal was held last month you told us that you had no objection to prices and availability being given to the Iraqis for certain equipments. These were:

81mm mortars and ammunition
122mm gun " "
120mm ammunition
25 pdr ammunition
140/70 Gun complete with radar

Prices were mentioned generally but we have now been asked by the Iraqis for a formal quotation. As these are sent out as an offer to supply, would you please confirm that there are no objections to such an offer being made.

The quantities requested and which we can supply are as follows:-

81mm mortars	100	
81mm amm	5,000	} HE + 10% Smoke
	10,000	
	15,000	
120 recoilless amm	5,000	} UK Types
	10,000	
	15,000	
25 pr amm	20,000	HE
	2,000	Smoke

Prices for these are as follows:

81mm mortar	£1,200 0s 0d each
81mm HE	£8 17s 6d each
Smoke	£10 15s 0d each

Delivery in 12 months from date of order.

The total value of the 25 pr order is £250,000 and delivery would be in 18 months from date of order.

/Investigations

A.D.G. Stephenson, Esq
Defence Training & Supply Dept
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

CONFIDENTIAL

Investigations are still being made into the cost and delivery of the 120mm ammunition.

(now said to be between £800,000 - £1,000,000)
18 months delivery.

James Limerick
Arthur Miller

Copy to J.B.Wade Esq., MOD DS13

Now see
SUBMISSION
AT


(18)

PMW

13/6

CONFIDENTIAL

N. Easton



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street

RECEIVED IN
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone 01-928 7999, Ext 4464

6 JUN 1969

Our ref: D/D Sales (A)/54/38/2

NEQ 10/4

5th June 1969

Dear Stephenson,

OVERSEAS SALE OF GRENADES 83 COLOURED
SMOKE TO IRAQ

An enquiry has been received from the Embassy of Iraq for the supply of 4000 Grenades 83 various Coloured Smoke.

Delivery of this order, valued at £9,600, could take place in 6-8 weeks from British Army stocks or 20 months from new production.

Have you any objections to the supply of the Grenades please.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
A.D.G. Stephenson Esq
Defence Training and Supply Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Copy for information to:-

J.B.Wade, Esq., MOD DS 13b

In Hinchcliffe. NED

Re [Signature]

6/6

Defence Training & Supply Department,

(12)

11 June, 1969.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

DP
11/6

Will you please refer to your letter of 5 June about the sale of Grenades 83 coloured smoke to Iraq.

2. I am writing to inform you that there is no F.C.S. objection to the proposed supply of these grenades to Iraq.

(R. N. Jones)

R. N. Shallerd, Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
Ministry of Defence,
St. Christopher House,
Southwark Street,
LONDON, S.E.1.

PA [Signature]

Mr Jones DTSD

I understood that Stephenson
is still away.

There is no volitional objection to
the role of ~~the~~ Colonel Smoke Grenades
to Iraq.

PMH

NIED.

9/6/69

This too will have to
be taken into account
in our analysis of British interests
in Iraq, & Anglo/Iraqi relations
generally.

Mr. Brant

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Iraqi Oil

Copy 4002
NEQ 10/4.

NEQ 3/548/1

Put on

Anglo/Iraqi
Relations File

with copy

in Amman
to Iraq

11/6

When I lunched with Mr. Dalley of the IPC last week, I found him in a rather gloomy mood. Although he had just learned of the successful conclusion of the negotiations in the South over port dues, he seemed to have little hope that there was much chance of a more general settlement. He was also depressed by renewed pressure from the Iraq Government to "recruit" skilled IPC Iraqi staff for service with INOC and feared that, if this trend continued, he might be forced to increase the number of expatriates working for IPC in Iraq. It was very hard to find suitable people when conditions there were so difficult.

2. Mr. Dalley said that he personally believed it would not be possible to continue to run IPC on the basis of preserving the status quo more than another six months or so. He did not question that the policy adopted up to now had been right from the point of view of the groups in view of the companies' wider interests, in spite of all the difficulties involved for him and other IPC staff: but he thought there would soon have to be a forward move of some kind on the part of the companies if they wished IPC to continue operating in Iraq. Now that the port dues question had been settled, he would be pressing for another mission to go to Baghdad for discussion of the overall problems. He expected that the groups would agree to this.

3. It was difficult at this stage, however, to say whether any negotiating would have anything worthwhile to offer the Iraqis. Certainly, they would not concede all that the latter were demanding in terms of advance payments. I asked whether, as had been mooted in the past, there might be a partial offer, e.g. over the introduction of expensing from 1 January 1969, leaving the backlog for use in seeking an Iraqi quid pro quo. Mr. Dalley said this was certainly a possibility. He would favour it, but the American members were strongly opposed.

4. Mr. Dalley said he thought things might come to a head over North Rumaila before long. The latest rumour to reach him was that the Iraqis might be contemplating an arrangement with the Czechs. He did not appear to have any firm details, but suggested the Czechs might be paid in oil for any work they did for the Iraqis and that this oil might be used to supply Soviet customers East of Suez, the Russians for their part re-imbursing the Czechs with oil from the Soviet Union supplied through the Friendship Pipeline.

/5. Mr. Dalley

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Mr. Dalley said he had established a cordial relationship with the Mitsubishi representatives in London. As there had been talk from time to time of Japanese meddling in Iraq, he had taken such opportunities as had offered to impress on Mitsubishi the importance of upholding the sanctity of contracts in the oil-producing countries. The Japanese companies themselves, in view of their growing stake, had an interest in this too. He hoped that the point had sunk in and that M.I.T.I. would have become aware of his contacts. I said I thought the word would have got back.

6. I asked Mr. Dalley about the implications for IPC of the Tapline incident. He said that the value of IPC's Mediterranean terminal crude would be enhanced, but there was no question of them stepping up supplies. The IPC pipeline was already working to capacity. Mr. Dalley mentioned in this connection that, although there had been no recent serious attacks by the Kurds, the existing damage was not likely to be wholly made good for some time. They were only just managing to keep up the flow from Kirkuk, with a good deal of improvisation.

7. In response to my question, Mr. Dalley said that the visit of Lt. Jiburi had probably been worthwhile as a goodwill gesture, but he doubted whether there would be much improvement in practice in the security measures taken to protect oil installations.

8. Mr. Dalley expressed appreciation for the summaries of the Baghdad press we were making available on the basis of material supplied by the Embassy. He was also grateful for the note on the political situation in the Lebanon and said he would always be grateful for such information about that country. Also about Syria.

9. Mr. Dalley asked for the earliest possible notification of any firm indication that Takriti intended to visit the U.K. He agreed that Takriti was well-disposed, but hesitated to over-emphasise his power within Iraq.



(R.H. Ellingworth)
Oil Department
9 June, 1969

c.c. Mr. Gallagher
Mr. Arthur
N.E.D.
Mr. Gregory, Min. of Power
Mr. Derrick, Treasury
Mr. Hawley, Baghdad
Mr. Willmot, Washington
Mr. Galsworthy, Paris

Mr. Olver, The Hague
Mr. Cortazzi, Tokyo
Mr. Rich, Prague.

PO


CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/4

Reference

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
11 JUN 1969
NEQ 10/4

(13)

in Adh
Mr. Ibbott, *(Arabian desert)*
Mr. Goulty. *afk.*

Arms for Iraq

Attached below is a copy of a letter from M.O.D. (Sales) asking if we have any objection to the sale to Iraq of the arms and ammunition quoted in the third paragraph.

2. I feel (D.T.S.D. concur) that we should allow this sale but I would welcome the views of your Department before submitting a definitive recommendation.

3. We have supplied 160 25-pounder guns to Iraq in the distant past and substantial quantities of ammunition, most recently in 1963 and 1968. The 120 mm recoilless ammunition is for an obsolete battalion anti-tank gun originally manufactured by the Americans but it has been generally available to any countries who want it for many years.

4. You may be more concerned about the 81 mm mortars. I understand from M.O.D. (Sales) that we have supplied or are supplying similar mortars to Abu Dhabi, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait and Muscat. If we do not approve the sale the Iraqis could purchase an identical weapon from France, Belgium or Sweden. The U.S.S.R. manufacture a comparable mortar.

5. The Iraqis already have 3" and 82 mm infantry mortars but the 81 mm which has been in service with NATO countries for about five years is superior in performance to the obsolete 3" and 82 mm. It is known that the Iraqis have been training and equipping Omani rebels so it is possible that these mortars might be supplied to subversive organisations in the Sultanate. On the other hand it seems more probable that as this particular mortar is superior to any already possessed by the Iraqi army that it is earmarked for service with the regular forces.

6. I should add that the "General Staff" regard all these items as unclassified and have no objection to their sale to Iraq.

Reg & Pa. P.M.H. 11/6

P.M.H. Hinchcliffe
(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)

9 June 1969

c.c. Mr. Acland

I see no objection to the sale of these weapons to the Iraqis.
Butcher 10/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

I agree that, especially in view of the
attached letter from the Cabinet Office, we
should allow this sale

Alan F. Gaulty.

A. M. M.

27/6


CONFIDENTIAL

(14)

M. Trippe agrees that
we should proceed as
BRITISH EMBASSY, we had in
TEHRAN. mind.

10/4

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 JUN 1969 NEQ 10/4



5 June, 1969

7/11/69

Copy for
NEQ 10/4

M. Trippe

Placards 13/6

Dear Peter,

Arms for Iraq

We are a little troubled here about Baghdad telegrams Nos. 458 and 474 about arms sales to Iraq. I am in some difficulty because we have not seen Baghdad telegrams Nos. 456 and 457, nor F.C.O. telegram No. 420 to Baghdad. However, though we do not know what precisely is involved, I thought I had better light a warning flare from this post.

2. When the possibility of supplying Lightnings to the Iraqis arose earlier in the year we commented (Tehran telegram No. 86) that the Iranians would be unlikely to react unfavourably if we were to do this, though you will recall that the Ambassador asked for authority to warn the Iranians in advance if the deal looked like becoming actual and before anything became public knowledge.

3. With the development of the Shatt dispute, the situation has changed considerably since our telegram was sent, and so, of course, have the Shah's views of the Iraqi regime. An announcement at this time of a British arms contract for Iraq, or indeed the hint that something of the sort might be in the air, would have a serious effect on Anglo-Iranian relations and could land us in much difficulty. It would not now simply be a matter of explaining away our action or intentions to the Shah and the Iranian Government. I think we would need to be consulted at all appropriate steps of your considerations of what might be offered to the Iraqis; and, at the time of writing, I think it would be fair to say that you should not assume that any sales of arms or equipment to Iraq could be put over here without a pretty hefty struggle in which we might lose much goodwill over other essential issues.

Yours ever A. Croft
TAMEN

D. F. Murray

(D. F. Murray)

1a
PMM

13/6

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

Cc. to:

P. McKearney, Esq., BAGHDAD.

CONFIDENTIAL

1e WMB
15
CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/4

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 398

TO TEHRAN
13 JUNE 1969. (NED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 398 OF 13 JUNE REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD.

10/4 (14)
MURRAY'S LETTER 16/4 OF 5 JUNE TO TRIPP: ARMS FOR IRAQ.

WE WILL OF COURSE KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY ARMS DEALS WITH IRAQ
WHICH COULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON ANGLO/IRANIAN RELATIONS.

2. THE ONLY FIRM ORDER UNDER CONSIDERATION AT PRESENT IS FOR THE
FOLLOWING ITEMS:

- (A) ONE HUNDRED 81 MM MORTARS AND 20,000 ROUNDS OF H.E. AMMUNITION:
- (B) 20,000 ROUNDS 120 MM RECOILLESS AMMUNITION.
- (C) 70,000 ROUNDS OF H.E. 25 POUNDER AMMUNITION:

(B) AND (C) ARE FOR OBSOLETE WEAPONS, IN SERVICE WITH THE IRAQ ARMY
FOR MANY YEARS. WE WERE THE ORIGINAL SUPPLIERS OF THE 25 POUNDERS
AND HAVE SOLD THEM AMMUNITION ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS - MOST RECENTLY
IN EARLY 1968. WE HAVE SUPPLIED OR ARE SUPPLYING 81 MM MORTARS TO
OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA INCLUDING ABU DHABI, KUWAIT, MUSCAT AND
BAHRAIN. REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IRAQ WOULD MERELY ADD A FURTHER STRAIN
TO ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS AND THE IRAQIS COULD (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
THE 25 POUNDER AMMUNITION) OBTAIN COMPARABLE HARDWARE FROM ELSEWHERE
WITHOUT MUCH DIFFICULTY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. IN VIEW

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

3. IN VIEW OF THE COMPARATIVE SMALLNESS OF THE ORDER (ABOUT £1.7 MILLION) AND THE UNSOPHISTICATED NATURE OF THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION WE PROPOSE TO AGREE TO THE SALE. WE ASSUME THAT YOUR CONCERN IS WITH MORE SOPHISTICATED AND CONTROVERSIAL WEAPONS (E.G. LIGHTNINGS OR MISSILES) BUT WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY CONFIRMATION THAT YOU SEE NO GREAT DIFFICULTIES OVER THE PRESENT IRAQI ORDER. WE WOULD HOPE THAT YOU NEED NOT REPEAT NOT INFORM THE IRANIANS. THERE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ANY PUBLICITY.

4. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, BEFORE THE SHATT AL ARAB DISPUTE BROKE OUT AGAIN, TO SELL TIGERCAT TO IRAQ, AND THE IRAQIS WERE INFORMED. SINCE THEN HOWEVER THEIR INTEREST SEEMS TO HAVE FADED AND NO FIRM ORDERS HAVE YET BEEN PLACED.

STEWART.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.
D.T.S.D.
ARABIAN D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No. **NE**
DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret Secret <u>Confidential</u> Restricted Unclassified	Flash Immediate Priority Routine

(Date)

~~Despatched~~

14/6

0517

PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair.
Code
<u>Cypher</u>

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to TEHRAN

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to BAGHDAD

Saving to

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 16 JUN 1969 NEQ 10/4

Draft Telegram to:—
TEHRAN

No. 398

(Date) 13/6

And to:—

Repeat to:—
BAGHDAD

Murray's letter 10/4 16/4 of 5 June to Tripp:
Arms for Iraq.

We will of course keep you informed of any arms deals with Iraq which could have repercussions on Anglo/Iranian relations.

2. The only firm order under consideration at present is for the following items:

- (a) One hundred 81 mm mortars and 20,000 rounds of H.E. ammunition;
- (b) 20,000 rounds 120 mm recoilless ammunition.
- (c) 70,000 rounds of H.E. 25 pounder ammunition;
- (b) and (c) are for obsolete weapons, in service with the Iraq army for many years. We were the original suppliers of the 25 pounders and have sold them ammunition on several occasions - most recently in early 1968. We have supplied or are supplying 81 mm mortars to other countries in the

Departmental
Distribution:—

N.E.D.
D.T.S.D.
Arabian

Copies to:—


CONFIDENTIAL

/area

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

[Signature]

1725/13/62



Arca

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

area including Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Muscat and Bahrain. Refusal to supply Iraq would merely add a further strain to Anglo/Iraqi relations and the Iraqis could (with the exception of the 25 pounder ammunition) obtain comparable hardware from elsewhere without much difficulty.

3. In view of the comparative smallness of the order (about £1.5 million) and the unsophisticated nature of the weapons and ammunition we propose to agree to the sale. We assume that your concern is with more sophisticated and controversial weapons (e.g. Lightnings or missiles) but we would be grateful for early confirmation that you see no great difficulties over the present Iraqi order. We would hope that you need not repeat not inform the Iranians. There is not likely to be any publicity.

4. For your own information, we agreed in principle, before the Shatt al Arab dispute broke out again, to sell Tigercat to Iraq, and the Iraqis were informed. Since then however their interest seems to have faded and no firm orders have yet been placed.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

NEQ 10/4

En Clair

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO TEHRAN

Telno 400

16 June, 1969

(NE)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Tehran telegram No.400 of 16 June,
And to Baghdad

Our telegram No.398 [of 13 June].

Paragraph 2 (c) should read 20,000 not (repeat not)
70,000.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

D.T.S.D.

Arab Dept.

R. P. WMM

Registry No. **NE**
DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified UNCLASS.	Flash Immediate Priority Routine

(Date).....
Despatched **DESPATCHED** 1036

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 16 JUN 1969 NEQ 10/4

PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. ✓ Code Cypher

[Security classification —if any] Unclassified

[Privacy marking —if any] —

[Codeword—if any] —

Addressed to TEHRAN

telegram No. 400 (date) 16/6/69

And to BAGHDAD

repeated for information to DEADEND (REMOVED)

Saving to.....

Draft Telegram to:—

TEHRAN
No. 400

(Date) 16/6

And to:—

BAGHDAD

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

OUR TELEGRAM 398 [OF 13 JUNE]
~~ALREADY TRANSMITTED~~

PARA 2 (C) SHOULD READ
20,000 ~~20,000~~ NOT (R) NOT
70,000 ~~70,000~~

Distribution:—

DEPARTMENT
NEQ

~~DTSD~~

AMMAN DEP.
Copies to:—

PKM Humble

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

16/6/69
10052
16/6/69

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

17

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY TEHRAN

TELEGRAM NO. 563

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

18 JUNE 1969

1	2	3
REC	N	3
18 JUN 1969		
NEQ 10/4		

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 563 OF 18 JUNE, REPEATED FOR INFMN TO BAGHDAD.

30/6

15

YOUR TEL NO 398: ARMS FOR IRAQ.

I FORESEE NO DIFFICULTIES IN THE CASE OF THE ORDERS IN YOUR PARA 2 AND NO NEED TO TELL THE IRANIANS. IF THEY WERE EVER TO ENQUIRE, WE COULD EXPLAIN MATTERS ON THE LINES OF YOUR PARA 2.

2. I CONFIRM THAT OUR CONCERN IS WITH MORE SOPHISTICATED ITEMS, E.G. AIRCRAFT OR MISSILES. IF INTEREST IN TIGERCAT WERE TO REVIVE IT MIGHT BE PRUDENT TO TELL THE IRANIANS THAT AN ORDER WAS IN THE OFFING.

FCO PASS BAGHDAD.

SIR D. WRIGHT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EAST D.
DEF. T & S.D.
ARAB.. D.

PA /MM

CONFIDENTIAL

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
(COVERING SECRET)

18.

Mr. Rights

Mr. Arthur

Mr. Miller



Arms for Iraq

Problem

10

We have been asked by the Ministry of Defence (Sales) if there are any objections to the sale to Iraq of the following items:

FLAG A

81 mm mortars	100
81 mm ammunition	20,000 H.E. 2,000 smoke
120 recoilless ammunition	20,000
25 pounder ammunition	20,000 H.E. 2,000 smoke

2. The Iraqis have asked for a formal quotation which, as is the normal procedure, would be sent out as an offer to supply. The total value of the order is approximately £1.5 million. Delivery of the mortars and bombs would be within twelve months from date of order and that of the other items within 18 months.

3. Recommendation

I recommend that we should agree in principle to the sale of these items to Iraq but that before we inform the Ministry of Defence of our decision we should give H.M. Ambassador in Tehran an opportunity to comment. A draft telegram to Tehran is attached. Defence Training and Supply Department and Arabian Department concur.

...

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Argument

25 pounder and 120 mm ammunition are for obsolete weapons, one a field artillery piece, the other a battalion anti-tank gun, which have been in service with the Iraqi forces for a number of years. The 81 mm mortar is the most modern infantry mortar in service with any army and has been in use with NATO forces over the last five years. All the items have an "unclassified" security rating and the General Staff have no objection to their supply to Iraq.

5. The principles which govern decisions we make on the supply of arms to the Arab States are set out in Paper (OPD(67)78) which the former Secretary of State submitted to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in November, 1967. The principles relevant in this case are that:

- (a) We should continue to have regard to the effective balance of forces in the area (Middle East) in all our decisions about arms supplies;
- (b) we should as far as possible avoid supplying arms of greater offensive power than those already employed in the area and we should not supply arms which are exclusively offensive in character;
- (c) we should examine particularly closely the supply of arms to Arab countries which maintain a hostile attitude towards us.

6. Agreement on our part to supply Iraq with these items would not conflict with principles (a) and (b). 25 pounder guns and 120 mm Battalion Anti-Tank guns have been in service with the Iraqi army for several years. Both weapons (the first of British

/manufacture

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

manufacture and originally supplied by us, the second made in the United States) are obsolete - indeed the Iraqis have recently been reported to be phasing out their 25 pounders. The amount of ammunition that we have been asked to supply for these weapons is not very great - less than 300 rounds per 120 mm gun (the Iraqis are known to have 71 in service) and in the case of the 25 pounder H.E. ammunition, less than 120 rounds for each of the 160 field guns of that calibre in Iraq. We have supplied or have agreed to supply 81 mm mortars to Kuwait, Muscat, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and although this weapon is more modern than any infantry mortar already in service with the Iraqi forces it is unlikely (especially in view of the size of the order) to improve to any significant extent the offensive power of the Iraqi army vis-a-vis other countries in the area, including Israel. None of the items concerned are exclusively offensive in character.

7. (c) is more difficult. The Iraqi régime, continues to misinterpret and misrepresent British policies. The CENTO meeting in Tehran, and the Secretary of State's bilateral talks with the Shah, have been construed in Iraqi official circles - and accordingly condemned in the government controlled press - as evidence of British participation in the Shatt el Arab dispute and in Iraq/Iran rivalry over the Gulf. The left wing, pro-Soviet bloc party in the Iraq Ba'ath régime appear to be in control at present. Indications of this are the various recent commercial and cultural agreements with Bloc countries and Iraqi recognition of the German Democratic Republic.

/8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

FLAG C

8. Thus at an official level Anglo/Iraqi relations are again at a low point. However, there are influential elements within the Iraqi régime - headed by the Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Hordan al Takriti who claim to deplore Iraq's flirtation with the Soviet bloc and seem to want closer ties with the West in general and with Britain in particular. H.M. Ambassador believes that we should give them what encouragement we can and recommends in particular that one way of doing this would be to show a willingness to supply arms to the Iraqi armed forces. This is a valid point and the withholding of permission to the sale of these items would achieve little except to add to the present régime's persecution complex and to put a fresh strain on Anglo/Iraqi relations. The Iraqis would no doubt turn elsewhere for supplies (and with the exception of the 25 pounder ammunition) they would be able to obtain comparable equipment without difficulty. If we are unable to supply this order, we might as well accept that we can supply no military equipment at all to the Iraqis, and so inform them, so that the visits in search of arms purchases can cease and do not merely raise false hopes.

9. Our Embassy in Tehran have expressed fears that an arms contract with Iraq (if it became known) would have a serious effect on Anglo/Iranian relations in view of the recent Iranian/Iraqi confrontation over the Shatt al Arab. It seems probable that the Embassy is thinking in terms of an arms deal involving sophisticated "heavy" equipment - aircraft (e.g. Lightnings) or missiles. It is unlikely that they would be seriously concerned with the items now in question.

CONFIDENTIAL.

/However

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

However, we should inform the Embassy of our intention to supply these to Iraq and we can reconsider the matter if the Ambassador raises serious objections.


10. We have also considered the possibility that the mortars might be used to help Iraqi equipped and trained subversive elements operating against the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

However, in view of the fact that this type of mortar is superior in performance to the obsolete 3" and 82 mm Infantry mortars now in use with the Iraqi army, it is probable that they are earmarked for service with the regular forces.

11. Background

All 160 25 pounders in service with the Iraqi army are British supplied. We agreed in principle to supply a further 50 during 1967/68 but the offer was not taken up by the Iraqis. We have supplied substantial quantities of 25 pounder ammunition before - most recently in 1963 and early 1968. We have not supplied 120 mm recoilless ammunition in the past, but we have sold the Iraqis 3" mortar ammunition and it seems probably (although we have no record of this) that we were the original suppliers of the 3" mortars still in service with the Iraqi army.

12. We agreed to supply the Tigercat ground to air missile to Iraq in February this year, and the Iraqis have been informed. In the event, Iraqi interest has for the moment faded but the weapon concerned is more sophisticated and more controversial - from the point of view of our Middle East arms policy - than any of the items covered by this paper.


(J.P. Tripp)
13 June, 1969.

/The

Folio (15)

The telegram to Tehran may issue; but before we decide finally on these supplies, the papers should be resubmitted (with Tehran's reply) to the Minister of State.

9.12.13.6.

8/13

Mr. Doane. ~~PM~~ 16/6

Mr. Hinchcliffe PM 18/6

Telegram now received from Tehran. (FLAG E) The Ambassador has objection to this sale. PM 18/6. (17)

I recommend that we should agree to these supplies.

E. L. Lunn
9/6

Minister of State (Mr. Roberts)

(Folio (17))

^{agree.}
Sir D. Wright's telegram (Flag E) is conclusive.

Re 20/6

Jhr. 1/7

Mr. Hinchcliffe
Pa ~~PM~~

Mr. Muller M.O. (Sole) informed by telegram 20/6. Letter will be sent in confirmation. ~~PM~~ 20/6

Folio (15)

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(Folio (17))

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Re 20/6

Jhr. 1/7

Mr. Hinchcliffe
Pa ~~PM~~

Mr. Muller M.O. (Sole) informed by telegram 20/6. Letter will be sent in confirmation. PM 20/6

CONFIDENTIAL

Defence Training & Supply Department

19

REQ 10/4

24 June, 1969.

Thank you for your letter 10/Clearances/1778 of 29 May concerning the Iraqi interest in the supply of 81 millimeter mortars, ammunition, and also 120 recoilless ammunition and 25 pr HE and smoke.

2. I confirm that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would raise no objection to the supply of the above items to Iraq.

(A.D.G. Stephenson)

A. Miller, Esq.,
Sales 5(b)(A),
Ministry of Defence,
St. Christopher House,
Southwark Street,
London, S.E. 1.

1a 10/10/69
26/5

D/D 25/6

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry
No. NEA 10/4

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

To:—
A. MILLER Esq,
SALIS 5 (b) (A)
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House
Southwark Street
London S.E.1

From

A. D. G. STEPHENSON

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

DTSD.

Thank you for your letter 10/Clearance/1778
of 29 May concerning the Iraqi interest in
the supply of 81 millimeter mortars, ammunition,
and also 120 recoilless ammunition and 25 lb
HE and smoke.

2 I confirm that the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office would raise no objection to the supply of the
above items to Iraq

A

24/6

Mr Stephen.

DTSD.

ARMS FOR 1 MAR


Please see (10) & the enclosing
Submun at (18). Mr James
kindly concerned on your behalf!

I have told Miller, M.O. Secs
of the FCD's decision (over the
telephone) but ~~the~~ the official
letter giving formal approval
should, as is the normal practice, come
from your department.

PMH Hurd
20/6/69.

From: R.H. Shellard Sales 5p(A)

N. Eastern.



Please file P.A. 27/6

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street

London S.E.1

Telephone 92847999 Ext. 4464

REGISTRY No. 19

June 1969

30 JUN 1969

NEQ 10/4

Our Ref: D/D Sales(A)/54/38/2

Dear Stephenson,

f 11. refer.

With reference to our telephone conversation of the 24th June, I write to record that you had no objection to an additional supply of 16,000 Grenades 83 Coloured Smoke to IRAQ. The extra requirement will be supplied from new production in 20 months time.

Michael James in his letter of the 11th June, stated that there was no objection to the supply of the original order of 4,000 Grenades 83 Coloured Smoke.

Yours sincerely,


A.D.G. Stephenson, Esq.
Defence Training and
Supply Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Copy for information to:-

J.B. Wade, Esq., MOD DS 13b

Please enter *OK*
From R.H. Shellard

Sales 5. b (A)




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone:- 01-928-7999 Extn. 4464

18th July 1969

Our reference:- D/D Sales(A)/54/38/4



Dear Tony,

An enquiry has been received from the Iraqi Embassy concerning the supply of 250,000lbs of Plastic Explosives PE 4A for use in demolition work, or alternatively a similar quantity of Plastic Explosives PE 3A if the PE 4A is not available.

The value of this order is approximately £150,000 but we do not expect to be able to meet the full requirement immediately. Our enquiries into availability from stock or new production are not yet complete.

Subject, of course, to the availability of these stores, Have you any objection to the supply of 250,000lbs of Plastic Explosives (Type PE 4A or 3A) to Iraq, please.

Yours *etc.*

Handwritten signature
Handwritten: A.D.G. Stephenson


A.D.G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Training and Supply Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Copy for information to:-

J.B. Wade, Esq., MCD DS 13b

Please enter 24/7
From R. H. Shellard Sales 6 b (A)

22



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone:- 01-928-1555 Extn. 4464

23rd July 1969

RECEIVED
REGISTRY N.

25 JUL 1969

NEG 10/4

Our reference:- D/D Sales (A)/54/38/4

Dear Tony

We have received an enquiry from the Iraqi Embassy for the supply of 150 Exploders type Beethoven. The Beethoven Exploder is a plunger type of device used for initiating the explosive used in demolition work and open-cast quarrying.

There are no British Army stocks available to meet this request. but we can give the name of the trade source of supply to the Iraqi Embassy. The General Staff raise no objection to this action.

However, we would not wish to give this information if the eventual export were not permitted, and we would be grateful for your views on this matter.

Yours ever.

A. D. G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Training and Supply Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Copy for information to:-

J. B. Wade, Esq. MOD DS 13b

BU with File (21) on Main File on 11/8

Mr Shellard
He will have
to consider this together
with the other requests
to Explaners &
Gen. Allthorpe
28/7

CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you #2617

Mr Stephen, D.T.S.D.

Please see Folio (21)

This is only the tip of the iceberg. I have now heard from Mr Skellard that the Iraqis have obtained ICI for a large quantity of fuses, fuse wire, detonators etc. They also used like plungers box detonators.

On the face of it there follows one for Arabian projects - ("demolition work" is understood!) but there is a security angle as well as Iraq helps such religious organizations as P.F.L.O.A.G. & O.R.M. in the Gulf and has our Fedayeen organization. The Arab Liberation Front. When we know the full extent of the Iraqi shipping but we will consider whether or not we should object to this sale.

Mr Skellard is writing with

Further details in about a week's
time.

P. M. H. H. H.

WED

24.7.69

~~80~~ noted.
on 34/7.

P. M. H. H. H.

25/7


now let with

(22)

on 11/8

P. M. H. H. H.

6/8




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone:- 01-928-7999 Extn. 4464

8th August 1969

Our reference:- D/D Sales (A)/54/38/4



See f. 29
me
28/8

Dear Tany,

(21)

Demolition Stores for IRAQ

1. Please refer to my letter of even reference dated the 18th July 1969 concerning the possible supply of 250,000lbs of Plastic Explosives to Iraq.

2. Mr. Hinchcliffe, of your office, and I have had several telephone conversations on this subject and as a result of further investigations I was able to inform him that the Plastic Explosive was only one item of an Iraqi shopping list which had been sent out by the Military Attaché's office at the Iraqi Embassy. The other items, for which we were not asked to quote prices and availability, were

250,000	Detonators No. 27
250,000	Electrical Detonators No.33 Mk.1
50,000lbs	Gun Cotton Wet
15,000	Ignitor Safety Fuze Electric (I.S.F.E.)
6,000	Safety Matches
250,000ft	Instantaneous Fuze
250,000ft	Safety Fuze No.11
50,000	Primers, Gun Cotton Dry.

3. Since I last spoke to Mr. Hinchcliffe I have seen a letter addressed to Army Sales from the Managing Director (a Mr. R. H. Jennings) of Singlepoint (Great Britain) Ltd., Kiln Acre, Wickham Road, Fareham, Hants. In his letter Mr. Jennings mentions that he has been asked to obtain the above items, including the Plastic Explosive, and in addition 10 4.2" Mortar barrels, and asks us for availability and prices. We are unable to supply the Mortar barrels.

4. The addition of the above items to the original enquiry makes quite a formidable demolition requirement, and it was thought expedient to reapproach the General Staff thereby giving them the opportunity of withdrawing their approval of the supply.

(22) 5. The General Staff comment that the total Iraqi requirement, ~~including the 150 tons of TNT (mentioned by Mr. Hinchcliffe)~~ and the 150 Exploders Type Beethoven (please see my letter dated the 23rd July) is well in excess of the British Army's annual requirement. They doubt whether there is a military operational use for this large quantity of demolition stores, but there could be a requirement for normal civilian mining operations in which case the M.A's office is being used for enquiry purposes. It could be possible that an element

/of the Iraqi

A. D. G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Training & Supply Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

Copy for information to:- J. B. Wade, Esq., MOD DS 13b


of the Iraqi Army is engaged in some major reconstruction scheme, e.g. road building, and need this quantity of demolition stores which if we do not supply they will undoubtedly obtain from other sources on the continent.

6. The General Staff consider that if it is believed the explosive is to be used for military purposes we should not provide it, but we should if there is a reasonable chance that most of the explosive will be used within Iraq for peaceful purposes. Perhaps you could enquire of the Embassy in Baghdad if they know about this particular order and the end use.

7. Our original letter dealt only with Plastic Explosives, but the enquiry from Singlepoint (Great Britain) Ltd. means that we have been asked to supply all the items on the shopping list, although Singlepoint (B.G.) Ltd. will have to provide evidence of accreditation. We have only made enquiries into the availability of Plastic Explosives. P.E. 3A is no longer used by the British Army, and some months ago we put out a general sales offer for our surplus stock. Only 2 sales resulted from this action, neither from Iraq, and in December 1968 instructions were given that the remaining stock could be destroyed. It is doubtful if all the stock has been destroyed, in which case we could supply all or part of the requirement.

8. Should you be able to confirm that the stores are to be used for peaceful purposes, perhaps you would agree to the supply of all the items shown overleaf or suitable alternatives if particular items are not available. If we are unable to supply we would give the trade source of supply.

Yours *ever*.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, possibly reading 'Ray', is written in dark ink. The signature is composed of several sweeping, interconnected strokes, with a prominent loop at the top and a long, sweeping underline.

SECRET

Near Eastern Department,

24

13 August, 1969.

(NEQ 10/4)

Explosives for Iraq

23 — I enclose a copy of a letter from Ministry of Defence (Sales) giving details of an Iraqi shopping list for detonators and fuses. They have repeatedly made enquiries about the availability of 150 plungers for setting off explosives (at a safe distance) and have asked us if we can supply 250,000 lbs. of plastic explosives PE 4A or 3A for "demolition work".

2. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Ministry of Defence letter queries the possible use of these supplies. Do you know of major schemes in which the Iraqi army or government contractors are engaged, which could absorb such a large amount of explosive?

3. The other type of "demolition work" which could be undertaken by the Iraqis is of course via Fedayeen or subversive groups within Israel and the occupied territories or in The Gulf. (Plastic explosive is particularly useful for that type of operation). This is something we will have to keep in mind when we consider whether we should or not agree to the supply of these materials to the Iraqis.

4. I would be grateful for your early comments so that we can reply to the Iraqi Embassy.

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

P. McKearney, Esq.,
BAGHDAD.

Mr. Stobbs 14/8

When we have a reply from Baghdad we will have to consider our attitude to these requests.

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe
13/8.

SECRET

SECRET

(25)



British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

(CSC/571)

23 August, 1969

Dear Peter

(24)

Explosives for Iraq

Your NEQ 10/4 of 13 August.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 29 AUG 1969
NEQ 10/4

2. The Iraqi Army no doubt need a certain amount of explosives for road-making in the mountainous country of Kurdistan, but we know of no large-scale construction project in which they are involved. It may very well be however that for reasons of security all the country's requirements of explosives for military and civil purposes are bought, imported and stored under the Army's supervision. If this were so, the quantities should be looked at not as compared with the British Army's annual requirements but as compared with the total needs of a developing country of this size in which the pace of construction of dams, roads and canals is fairly brisk.

3. We are looking for an opportunity to find out more about the purposes for which the explosives are wanted and will write again if we learn anything worth while.

Yours ever,

M.P.

(P. McKearney)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

Reg'd by

P.M.H.

24/8

Mr S. Telbener

3/9

SECRET

*Now pa —
see p. 29.
Jm 23/9*

CSC/571

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN



MINISTRY No. 10

29 AUG 1969

NEQ 10/4

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

29 August 1969

(26)

Dear Sirs,

Explosives for Iraq

(25)

(24)

We can now add a little more to our letter CSC/571 of 23 August in reply to your NEQ 10/4 of 13 August.

2. The Colonel in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence who is dealing with the matter told our Acting Defence Attaché that the explosives and associated equipment which they wish to buy are solely for use by the Engineer Regiments who are building roads in Northern Iraq and airfields. They are not wanted for warlike purposes.

See f. 29
Yours ever, P.M.

(P. McKearney)
16.11.69 23/9

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

~~Reply Comd
under C.S
to Mr STELLARD
H.D. Nelson
long letter on NEQ 10/4
P.M. 4/9~~

RESTRICTED

Near Eastern Department,

5 September, 1969.

(NEQ 10/4)

Demolition Stores for Iraq

(23)

Please refer to your letter (D/D Sales (A)/54/38/4) of 8 August, addressed to Mr. Stephenson, giving details of the Iraqi shopping list.

I sent a copy of your letter to our Embassy in Baghdad, mentioning that the Iraqis also wanted 250,000 lbs. of PE 4A or 3A (your letter of 18 July refers) asking if they knew of any demolition or construction works which could absorb so large a quantity of explosive.

I attach a copy of the reply from Baghdad, which you may wish to show to the General Staff in view of the interest that they have taken in this enquiry as described in paragraphs 5 and 6 of your letter under reference.

I would be grateful if you could let me know in due course if the General Staff oppose the supply of these explosives and ancilliary equipment to Iraq.

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

R. H. Shellard, Esq.,
Sales 5 b(A)

M.O.D.,

St. Christopher House,
Southwark Street,
London, S.E.1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry
No. NEQ 10/4

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~COVENANT SECRET~~

Type 1 + 3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret.~~

~~Secret.~~

~~Confidential.~~

~~Restricted.~~

~~Unclassified.~~

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

R.H. STELLARD ESQ.
AS FOLLOWS

From
P.M. Hinchcliff
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NEO

DEMOLITION STORES FOR IRAQ

Please refer to your letter

(D/D SALES(A)/54/38/4 of 8
August addressed to TOM STEPHENSON,
giving details of the Iraqi
shopping list.

I sent a copy of your letter
to our Embassy in Baghdad, mentioning
that the Iraqis also wanted 250,000 lbs
of PE 4A & 3A (your letter of 18
July refers) which if they knew
of any demolition or construction
work which could absorb so large
a quantity of explosive.

I attach a copy of the reply
to Baghdad, which you may wish to
show to the General Staff in view of

Good Friday
3/9
Mr. Stellard

DRSD.

(Please see
b (23)-(25))

P.M. Hinchcliff

2/9. NEO


the interest that they have taken in this
enquiry as detailed in paragraphs 5
and 6 of your letter under reference.

I would be grateful if you could
let me know in due course of the
General Staff ~~staff~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~office~~ ~~the~~
withy of these schemes and ~~an~~ ~~en~~ ~~en~~
request to Iraq.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

From:- R. H. Shellard Sales 5 b (A)

28



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone:- 01 - 928 - 7999 Extn. 4464

16th September 1969

Our reference:- D/D Sales (A)/54/38/4

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 18 SEP 1969 NEQ 10/4

Dear Hinchcliffe,

minute

19/9

Demolition Stores for Iraq.

NEQ 10/4

23/9 (27)

PM

Please refer to your letter NEQ 10/4 dated 5.9.69 concerning the supply of explosives and ancilliary equipment to IRAQ.

The copies of the letters attached to your letter have been shown to the General Staff who state that they have no operational objections to the supply of all the items concerned.

Y an. ev.

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Copy for information to:-

A.D.G. Stephenson, Esq., DT & SD, F & CO.

Registry No. NEQ 10/4	DRAFT letter	Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Top Secret. Secret Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.	To:— R.H. SHELLARD Esq	From A.D.G. STEPHENSON Telephone No. & Ext. Department DTSD
PRIVACY MARKING In Confidence		
	<p><u>Demolition Stores - Iraq.</u></p> <p>Please refer to your letter D/O Sales (4)/54/38/4 of 16 September, and also letter on the subject of demolition stores for Iraq.</p> <p>2 We do not feel that the risk of the explosives being used by guerrillas or for sabotage is a serious one. Saboteurs use relatively small amounts of explosives and these are readily available from other sources.</p> <p>3 In view of this the Foreign & Commonwealth office would raise no objection to the supply of the stores listed in your letter of even reference, dated 8 August.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">For signature please X</p>	

hi Tripp 902/22.9.

DTSD: hi Stephenson has seen.

Para 8 of hi Shellard's
letter d/d Subs (A) 54/38/4 7
8 Aug at f. 23 asks

(i) if we can confirm
that the stores, especially the
10 TONS of plastic explosive at
f21, will be used for peaceful
purposes;

& (ii) if we have any
objection.

2: we have gone as far
as we can in confirming
(i) — see f 26. The risk
of the explosives being used
for guerilla & sabotage does
not alarm the General Staff
(f 28). Saboteurs use relatively
small quantities, which are
easily obtainable from else
where, & which have nothing
to do with the size of this
order. I recommend we raise
no objection.

J. Malinton
NEP 19.9.69

letter f 29. New pa Jms

(REQ 10/4)

22 September, 1969.

Demolition Stores - Iraq

(28)

Please refer to your letter D/D Sales(A)/54/38/4 of 16 September, and other letters on the subject of demolition stores for Iraq.

2. We do not feel that the risk of the explosives being used by guerillas or for sabotage is a serious one. Saboteurs use relatively small amounts of explosives and these are readily available from other sources.

3. In view of this the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would raise no objection to the supply of the items listed in your letter of even reference, dated 8 August.

(23)


(A. D. G. Stephenson)
Defence Training & Supply Department

R. H. Shellard, Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
Ministry of Defence.

Jan 23/79

Please enter of 23/9
From:- R. H. Shellard Sales 5 b (A)

30



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone:- 01 - 928 - 7999 Extn. 4464

22 September 1969

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

24 SEP 1969

NEQ 10/4

Our reference:- D/D Sales (A)/54/38/3

Dear Tony,

Now see (31) (32)

An enquiry has been received by the Royal Small Arms Factory at Enfield from the Midland Mercantile Export Co. Ltd., 120 Bishopsgate London E.C.2.

The enquiry concerns a list of 46 different items of spare parts for the 30mm Aden and Hispano guns for Iraq. Although there is a total requirement of 2,161 spare parts most of these comprise of washers (1620), cams (120), springs (50), cotter slides (50), pins (48) and rings (42).

The requirement can be met by the R.S.A.F. Enfield from production. Have you any objections to the supply of the spare parts to Iraq, please.

Yours ever

A. D. G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Training and Supply Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.


Copy for information to:-

J. B. Wade, Esq., MOD DS 13b

Please enter 7/1/10

From:- R. H. Shellard Sales 5 b (A)

(3/)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone:- 01 - 928 - 7999 Extn. 1464

30th September 1969

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO. 1C
-20 OCT 1969

Our reference:- D/D Sales (A)/54/38/3

Dear Tony


NEQ 10/4

Artillery Spares for IRAQ

We have received an enquiry from the Embassy of Iraq for a quantity of spare parts for their 5.5" and 25Pdr Guns.

The 11 different items (303 actual spare parts) can be supplied from British Army stocks in 6 to 8 weeks time at a cost of about £1650.

On the 14th and 27th January 1969, your predecessor at the Defence Training and Supply Department stated that there were no objections to the supply of spares to IRAQ and we are therefore assuming that there will be no objections to the supply on this occasion.

Jan. ev

A. D. G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Training and Supply Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DTSD
No objection
Jm 3/10

Copy for information to:-

J. B. Wade, Esq., MOD DS 13

P. Jm

W. 30.

Reference _____

MR Bruchcliff

J.E.D.

Please see letter D/D Sales (A)/54/38/3 of 22
Sept.

2 Do you have any objection please?

containing
DTSD 26/9

9/10
to ~~Stephenson~~ DTSD

We spoke. On the
assumption that these weapons
are point three nought inch
(not 30 mm) there is no objection

Atkinson
NED 30/9

over

Mr Matanson

Since we spoke I contacted
Army Sales who say that these spares
are not for the aircraft Aden, but
for the anti-aircraft 30 mil Aden.
They say they have frequently supplied
these spares in the past.

C. S. Sullivan
DTSD 1/10

Mr Stephenson:
DTSD

I think we can agree
to A/A spares on "defensive"
grounds.

J. Matanson
3.10.69

(32)

(REQ 10/4)

6 October, 1969.

Artillery Spares - Iraq

(31) Please refer to your letter D/D Sales(A)/
54/38/3 of 30 September concerning the Iraq
enquiry for a quantity of spare parts for their
5.5" and 25 Pdr. guns.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would
raise no objection to the supply of these
items.

(A. D. G. Stephenson)
Defence Training & Supply Department

R. H. Shellard, Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
Ministry of Defence.

Don
7/10

Registry
No. NEQ 10/4

DRAFT letter .

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:—
R. H. SHELLARD Esq.
Sales 5b(A)
M. O. D .

From

A. D. G. STEPHENSON
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

DISD

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

ARTILLERY SPARES - IRAQ .

Please refer to your letter D/O Sales(A)/
54/38/3 of 30th September concerning
the Iraq enquiry for a quantity of
spare parts for their 5.5" and 25 Pdr
guns.

2 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office
would have no objection to the supply
of these items

for signature please

6/10

A.

Please enter 16/10
From:- R. H. Shellard Sales 5 b (A)



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Regelm
(33)

Telephone:- 01 - 928 - 7999 Extn. 4464

15th October 1969

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
17 OCT 1969

Our reference:- D/D Sales (A)/54/38/3

NEQ 10/3

Dear Tony

The Royal Ordnance Factory at Radway Green has received an enquiry from the British Manufacturing and Research Co. Ltd., Grantham for the supply of 900,000 30mm shells ready for filling and 900,000 partly machined shells (presumably 30mm). These are for eventual shipment to IRAQ should the firm receive a firm order.

In view of the large order involved and the eventual application by the British Manufacturing and Research Co. Ltd. for an Export Licence, may we please have your views on this matter.

The firm has pressed the urgency of their request and an early reply would be appreciated.

Yours ever.
[Signature]

A. D. G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Training and Supply Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Copy for information to:-

J. B. Wade, Esq., MOD DS 13b

Mr. Stepland 9/22/10

DTSD

Please see attached letter from
Mr. Stepland. M.O.D (Sales)

I think that this order (if it
is one) is such a large one that
it will require a minimum to at least
U/S level.

I wonder if we could find out

- (a) The value of the order
- (b) The exact type of shell (i.e.
for a/c or for anti aircraft guns)
- (c) If other countries could supply
if we refused
- (d) If we have supplies like to

Iraq. I think we have Hunter
aircraft. I have been that we
agreed to their supply just about the
time of the break in diplomatic relations
in June 1967.

(e) Is the "General Staff" has any objections.

If you could let me know

these details I will prepare a
memorandum for clearance by your
Department.

PMM Hinchell

NED

21/10/69

The ~~Memorandum~~ .
N.E.J.

a) I will find this out.

b) Aircraft ammunition

c) Yes — U.S.A., Russia, + others.

d) 1966 — 904,000 rounds

1967 — 900,000 rounds

1968 — 210,400 rounds

We have the market for this at present
& would like to keep it.

~~Supplement~~
22/10 DTD

Reply enter to be. There is now a short
bulletin supplier, this will be old also.

PMM

22/10

From:- R. H. Shellard *Please enter of 21/10*

Telephone: 01-928 7999


Extn. 4464

Please address any reply to
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

(Sales 5 (b) A)


and quote: D/D Sales (A)/54/38/3

Your reference:



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House
Southwark Street
LONDON, S.E.1.

(34)



20th October 1969

21 OCT 1969

NEQ 10/4

Dear Tony,

We wrote to you on ...22.9.69... about the supply of 30mm Aden and Hispano gun spares to IRA.

Your reply is still outstanding. We would be grateful for your reply as soon as possible please.

Yours ~~very sincerely~~

A. D. G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Supply Department
Foreign ~~Office~~ and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street

Mr Shellard *21/10* *Please see Memo from Mr*
Mahmud W 30 (3/10/69). He has
no objection to these sales. I have tried
Mr Shellard is on the telephone today *PMMA* *23/10.*
in the course of another conversation!

CONFIDENTIAL

(35)

RECEIVED IN R. 10 10/4

Mr. Acland

30mm Cannon Ammunition for Iraq

FLAG J

We have been asked by the Ministry of Defence (Sales) if there are any objections to the sale to Iraq of 1,800,000 rounds of 30mm cannon ammunition. The Royal Ordnance Factory will manufacture the shell cases which will be filled by the British Manufacturers and Research Company Ltd. The value of order, which I understand is confidently expected by BMARC, is £2-3 million.

2. This ammunition is almost certainly for the 50 Hunters in service with the Iraqi airforce which we supplied in 1963. We have provided 30mm cannon shells for these Hunters in the past; most recently:-

1966 ..	904,000 rounds
1967 ..	900,000 rounds
1968 ..	210,400 rounds

(we approved the supply of 900,000 - this during the break in relations).

3. Although we continue to be the traditional supplier of this ammunition, the Iraqis could obtain a similar shell from the USSR, USA or elsewhere.

4. Paragraph 9 (vii) of the OPD paper on the Middle East arms policy is relevant;

FLAG K

"in accordance with our established practice where we have supplied a particular type of equipment we should normally be ready to supply spares because of the overriding commercial interest involved".

Apart from the value of the order, the Royal Ordnance Factory is currently short of work and an order of this size would help to provide employment for a considerable period. The British Manufacturing and Research Company is a reputable firm and has supplied all the earlier Iraqi requirements for this type of ammunition.

5. The Iraqi Hunters, all obsolete models, are no longer front line aircraft and are mainly engaged in a training role and for (I suspect) operations in the north of Iraq. Refusal to supply would merely irritate the Iraqis who could shop elsewhere. Although the order is the largest individual one for some years, it

/is not

CONFIDENTIAL

is not of alarming proportions considering the number of Hunters in service with the Iraqi Air Force and in view of the high rate of cannon fire of which this aircraft is capable. (120 rounds per minute is the theoretical rate).

6. I recommend that we should tell MOD (Sales) that we have no objection to the supply of these shells to Iraq. Defence Training and Supply Department concur.

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
Near Eastern Department,
24 October, 1969.

I agree with this recommendation. We normally take the view that we should continue to supply spare parts and ammunition ~~which~~ for equipment which we have originally provided. We need to be sure that the amounts are reasonable. This is certainly a large order, but should, I think, be approved.

AA Acland
24/X

M. J. Jupp

I agree for the reasons given in the minutes above.

J.P.
24.10

Mr. Hinchcliffe

Mr. Stevenson

I have told Mr. Skelland on telephone but you may wish to confirm this in writing? Please recd. Colis

CONFIDENTIAL

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe

24/10

36

(NRQ 10/4)

28 October, 1969.

Aden and Hispano Gun Spares - Iraq

Thank you for your letter D/D Sales (A)/
54/38/3 of 20 October.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would
raise no objection to the supply of these
items to Iraq.

(A. D. G. Stephenson)
Defence Training & Supply Department

R. H. Shellard, Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
Ministry of Defence.

37

(NBQ 10/4)

28 October, 1969.

30 mm Cannon Ammunition - Iraq


Thank you for your letter D/D Sales (A)/
54/38/3 of 15 October.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would
raise no objection to the supply of 1,800,000
30 mm shells to Iraq.

(A. D. G. Stephenson)
Defence Training & Supply Department

R. H. Shellard, Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
Ministry of Defence.

From: - R. H. Shellard Sales 5 b (A)



RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
- 3.10.1969

NEQ 10/4

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
St. Christopher House, Southwark Street
LONDON S.E.1

Telephone:- 01 - 928 - 7999 Extn. 4464

30th October 1969

Our Reference:- D/D Sales (A)/54/38/3

69
Mr. Stephens
no section
from N.E.D.
R.M. Hall

Dear Tony,

We have received a request from the Iraqi authorities for the supply of 20 Apparatus Pulling Back Gun No. 7 Mk 1.

The apparatus is used with the 25Pdr Gun and we can supply the full requirement from British Army stocks in 2 months time at a cost of approximately £380.

Have you any objections to the supply of these items to Iraq, please.

Yours, ever
Ray.

A. D. G. Stephenson, Esq.,
Defence Training and Supply Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Copy for information to:-

J. B. Wade, Esq., MCD DS 13b

39

(REQ 10/4)

5 November, 1969.

Apparatus Pulling Back Gun - Iraq

Thank you for your letter D/D Sales(A)/
54/38/3 of 30 October.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would
raise no objection to the supply of 20 Apparatus
Pulling Back Gun No. 7 Mk 1 to Iraq.

(A. D. G. Stephenson)
Defence Training & Supply Department

R. H. Shellard, Esq.,
Sales 5b(A),
Ministry of Defence.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry
No. NEA 10/4

DRAFT letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~
Secret
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
Unclassified

To:—

R.H. Shellard Esq
SALES 56(A)

M.O.D.

From

A.D.G. STEPHENSON
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

DTSD

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Apparatus Pulling Back Gun - IRAQ.

Thank you for your letter d/d Sales
(A)/54/38/3 & 30 October.

2 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office
would raise no objection to the supply
of 20 Apparatus Pulling ~~Back~~ Back
Gun No 7 Mk 1 to Iraq.

for signature please

S/xl &

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM OYQ 110740Z

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
13 NOV 1969
NEQ 10/4
TO MOD ARMY

NOVEMBER 1969

Distributed to
~~M.D. (3)~~
Hd. of Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Policy Dept.
Defence Training & Supply Dept.
Hd. of P.U.S.D.
P.U.S.D.
Military Staff
NE Dept.
Hd. of Comms. Dept.
Examiners
File: Distribution Selectors.
Inform Registrar

CONFIDENTIAL

*Regis Please Conf on old pres.
military of wallam to
sing.
see F.(B) PMM 0/11.*

FOLLOWING FROM DEFAT FOR MOD ARMY TELNO OYQ 110740Z NOV 69

SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

1. IRAQIS WISH TO KNOW WHETHER WE
CAN SUPPLY TWENTY THOUSAND 7
POINT 62 RIFLES AND TWENTY MILLION ROUNDS AMMUNITION.
RIFLES PREFERABLY USED BUT SERVICEABLE.
2. IRAQI AIR FORCE PREPARED TO COLLECT FROM UK.
3. PRICES OF RIFLES AND PER THOUSAND ROUNDS REQUIRED.
4. ALTERNATIVES WERE NOT DISCUSSED BUT OFFER OF
303 IN SIMILAR QUANTITIES MIGHT BE WORTH TRYING IF 7-62 NOT
AVAILABLE.
5. NO INDICATION GIVEN OF USE TO WHICH RIFLES WILL BE PUT.
POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE ISSUE TO IRAQI FORCES, TO PRO-GOVERNMENT
KURDS OR TRIBAL LEVIES, TO PALESTINIAN COMMANDOS OR TO REBEL
ORGANISATIONS IN GULF OR ELSEWHERE. AN INQUIRY
ON THIS POINT WOULD DOUBTLESS PRODUCE AN INNOCENT ANSWER.
- ~~6. PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR FIRST REACTIONS EVEN THOUGH FIRM
ANSWERS MAY TAKE TIME.~~
- ~~6. PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR FIRST REACTIONS EVEN THOUGH FIRM
ANSWERS MAY TAKE TIME.~~
6. PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR FIRST REACTIONS EVEN THOUGH FIRM
ANSWERS MAY TAKE TIME.

P4 PMM 48/11
SECRET

Mr Stephen DTSD

Please refer to (40)

This is the first Iraqi report of 7.62 mm rifles as far as I know.

It would be useful to know the location of the "General Staff" to this rifle potential role. I would not have thought that this was the Iraqi regular forces but for some of the groups mentioned in Para 5 of the ~~minutes~~ telegram.

The "General Staff" may well ^{have been} to consider whether or not the 7.62 rifle could be a likely weapon to be used by Iraqi troops and equipped ~~divisions~~ operating in the Sultana of Muscat & Oman (Oman). This was point he considered when determining an attitude to the role of SMG to Iraq in June 1968. A mention of the small arms Embargo is at Para 4 of ~~the~~ ^{the} FLAG 'A' but I assume, with the restoration of diplomatic relations that this no longer applies.

PMH

REC. 14/11

1/11

W^R Hunchette
N. E. D.

We could not supply the 7.62
rifle anyway — we don't have any in
store. The 7.62 ammunition could
be supplied by making new stocks
in 9 to 12 months.

2 We could supply .303 rifle
if they would be prepared to accept
"bolt action" rifle, & we could
supply the 20,000,000 rounds of
ammunition. We would however
require an end user guarantee
before the General Staff would consider
it. However the rates required
are enormous for the long period.


14/11 DTSS

now see (L. 42)

P₄ 

18/11

4

9x

TO MOD ARMY

NOVEMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR MOD ARMY TELNO OYQ 130720Z NOV 69.

Mr. Stebbins

You like to
Cable Telegram
I think?
Full M. H. H. H.
nos
14/61

COMMENT. THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO SHOP SO WIDELY AND CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE CALIBRES CONFIRMS THE COMMON VIEW HERE THAT THE IRAQIS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THEIR SUPPLIES FROM BLOC SUPPLIERS.

PH.

Mr Knudsen
NED

P.H.
correct, with
JM 18/11 you now

I have seen it, but

I no longer have the file

PLWA

18/11

17/x1

TEL NO OYQ 130720Z NOV

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P.U.S.D.

1. Military Staff
1. Kerkin Dept.

Id. of Comms. Dept.

Examines

FOR MOD ARMY TELNO OYQ 130720Z NOV 69.

SMALL ARMS ARMS AND AMMUNITION. FURTHER TO MY OYQ-
OF 110740Z NOV 69. SINCE DRAFTING MY PREVIOUS TELEGRAM
TWO THINGS HAVE BECOME APPARENT.

FIRST. THAT THIS REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN PUT TO A
NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE SWEDES WHO WILL
NOT SUPPLY ON PRINCIPLE, THE AUSTRIANS WHO DOUBT THEIR
CAPACITY TO SUPPLY THE QUANTITIES REQUIRED AND WEST
GERMAN PRIVATE FIRMS WHO WERE INSTRUCTED TO BE DISCREET IN
THEIR ROUTING OF SUPPLIES. I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT
THE FRENCH AND SPANISH HAVE ALSO BEEN APPROACHED.

SECOND. THE REQUIREMENT IS REALLY FOR 7 POINT 92 RIFLES AND AMMUNITION AS OPPOSED TO 7 POINT 62 AS STATED TO ME.

COMMENT. THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO SHOP SO WIDELY AND CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE CALIBRES CONFIRMS THE COMMON VIEW HERE THAT THE IRAQIS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THEIR SUPPLIES FROM BLOC SUPPLIERS.

SENT TO D.C. PH.

PH.

correct, with
IM 18/11 you now

Mr Knudsen
NED

I have seen it, but

BALFOUR PAUL

SENT AT 1314Z/13

42

File R. 129

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Re mcl
PUMA
18/11

DF0072

DSAC-T-RR DEFAT BAGHDAD
RR F C O

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DE RBDWC 0774 3101756
R 141530Z NOV
FROM MOD ARMY
TO DEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO F AND CO
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L OYP YOUR SIGNALLS 110740Z NOV AND 130720Z
NOV REFER SUBJECT SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION PD NO SELF LOADING
RIFLES OF EITHER 7 POINT 62 OR 7 POINT 92 AVAILABLE BUT CAN OFFER
POINT 303 BOLT ACTION RIFLES IF REQUIRED PD CAN ALSO OFFER SOME
MILLIONS OF ROUNDS 7 POINT 62 BALL SAA PD OFFERS BE SUBJECT OF
COURSE OF ACCEPTABILITY OF END USER
BT

Re PUMA 19/11

Mr Stephen 17/11

W3 Handcliffe
N.E.D.

Army sales know this,
and full export licence procedure
would have to be carried out
before any decision was made, and
as you know whatever decision is
given the Political Clearance or
refusal overrides all the other ones.

20/11/69

I think the point should
be made to MOD that
Political Clearance will also
be required for such arms orders
Any offer to supply which is taken
up by the Iraqis and then has to
be withdrawn because of political
objections by FCO will cause great
offence.

Handcliffe
17/11

NEQ 10/4

Room 129

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER FTL/FTG
161015Z

TO DEFENCE COMMEN

16 DECEMBER 1969

Reg & pa
Don 19/12

Distributed to
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P.U.S.D.
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(H. N. East) Dept.
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RESTRICTED

FOR MOD UK FTL/FTG 161015Z DEC.

DURING A RECENT VISIT TO THE BABYLON MUSEUM HM AMBASSADOR WAS PRESENTED WITH A PAMPHLET ENTITLED QUOTE HORRORS OF NAPALM UNQUOTE PUBLISHED THIS YEAR BY THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND INFORMATION. IT IS ILLUSTRATED WITH PICTURES OF JORDANIAN VICTIMS AND AFTER AN INTRODUCTION ON FIRE AND WAR DESCRIBES FLAME THROWERS IN THE FIRST WAR. IT CONTINUES QUOTE. ALL MAJOR POWERS EMPLOYED FLAME THROWERS IN LATER YEARS. BRITISH AND U.S. FLAME THROWERS ARE NOW FUELLED WITH NAPALM. UNQUOTE. HM AMBASSADOR WISHES TO REFUTE THIS STATEMENT AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON OUR MILITARY HOLDING AND USES, IF ANY, OF NAPALM.

LAST PAPER

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

SENT 16/1410Z DEC

RCVD AT 16/1542Z DEC

[SENT TO DEC]

LAST PAPER

REC'D IN
DEC 11 1969
NEQ 10/4

PH.
43

Room 129

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER FTL/FTG
161015Z

TO DEFENCE COMMEN

16 DECEMBER 1969

Reg & pa
for 19/12

RESTRICTED

FOR MOD UK FTL/FTG 161015Z DEC.

Distributed to

~~MOD (12)~~

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DURING A RECENT VISIT TO THE BABYLON MUSEUM HM AMBASSADOR
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EMPLOYED FLAME THROWERS IN LATER YEARS. BRITISH
AND U.S. FLAME THROWERS ARE NOW FUELLED WITH NAPALM.
UNQUOTE. HM AMBASSADOR WISHES TO REFUTE THIS STATEMENT
AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ON OUR MILITARY HOLDING
AND USES, IF ANY, OF NAPALM.

LAST PAPER